Federal Courts Continue to Reject ICE’s Unlawful Re-Detention Practices — Four More Victories for Immigration Detainees in Minnesota
In recent months, federal judges in the District of Minnesota have continued to reject Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) unlawful practice of re-detaining individuals who were previously released under an order of supervision. Building on the precedents set in Roble v. Bondi and Sarail A. v. Bondi—two cases that first struck down ICE’s “changed circumstances” rationale as a violation of its own regulations—four additional recent cases have now resulted in the release of detainees under similar circumstances.
Each case reinforces the same fundamental principle: ICE cannot lawfully revoke supervised release and re-detain a noncitizen without first demonstrating genuine, legally supportable “changed circumstances” under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).
1. Yee S. v. Bondi — The Court Orders Immediate Release and Rebukes ICE’s “Boilerplate” Revocation Notices
In Yee S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2782 (JMB/DLM) (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025), Judge Bryan granted the habeas petition, ordering immediate release after finding that ICE failed to identify any legitimate “changed circumstances” to justify re-detention.
The court explicitly cited Roble and Sarail A. in holding that the agency’s vague assertion—that it was in the process of obtaining a travel document—did not satisfy the regulation’s requirements. Judge Bryan described ICE’s revocation notice as “boilerplate” and emphasized that the agency had offered “even fewer facts to justify a § 241.13(i)(2) determination in this case than in several other similar cases where courts granted petitions.” The order directed that the petitioner be released no later than 10 a.m. on October 10, 2025, and required the government to certify compliance.
This decision further solidifies what the earlier Roble and Sarail A. rulings established; ICE must follow its own regulations. Conclusory statements about a “likelihood of removal” or mere mention of a pending travel document are not enough to lawfully deprive a person of liberty.
2. Sonam T. v. Bondi — Government Abandons Opposition After Adverse Recommendation
In Sonam T. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2834 (JRT/DTS), the magistrate judge first issued a Report and Recommendation finding the re-detention unlawful under Roble and Sarail A. Rather than objecting, the federal government filed a Request for Remand for Petitioner’s Release, effectively conceding defeat.
Judge Tunheim adopted that request on September 19, 2025, ordering ICE to immediately release the petitioner under supervision and dismissing the case. The government’s withdrawal underscored that its re-detention practices could not withstand judicial scrutiny even when formally challenged.
3. Omar J. v. Bondi — Stipulated Release Without Opposition
In Omar J. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3719 (PJS/SGE), Chief Judge Schiltz signed an order approving a stipulation between the parties for the petitioner’s immediate release. The government agreed to remand the case to ICE and release the petitioner under an order of supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.
This stipulation marks another tacit acknowledgment that ICE lacked a lawful basis for re-detention. When pressed to justify the decision under § 241.13(i)(2), the government simply chose not to fight.
4. Mehran S. v. Bondi — Another Stipulated Release and Dismissal
That same day, Judge Nancy Brasel entered an identical order in Mehran S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3724 (NEB/DTS). Like in Omar J., the government stipulated to immediate release and dismissal without prejudice, again remanding to ICE to issue an order of supervision.
Together, the Omar J. and Mehran S. cases demonstrate that ICE and the Department of Justice have recognized—if only implicitly—that continued litigation over unlawful re-detentions under Zadvydas and § 241.13 is often indefensible.
A Growing Pattern — and a Warning to ICE
These rulings continue a clear and consistent line of decisions within the District of Minnesota. In Roble v. Bondi and Sarail A. v. Bondi, the courts held that ICE cannot detain individuals previously released under supervision unless it demonstrates both (1) a material change in circumstances and (2) a reasoned, evidence-based determination that removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Now, with Yee S., Sonam T., Omar J., and Mehran S., federal courts have expanded that precedent—showing that even when ICE tries to avoid judicial rulings by stipulating to release, its pattern of conduct remains constitutionally and procedurally defective. The agency’s repeated failures to articulate any lawful “changed circumstances” amount to an ongoing violation of its own regulations and the due-process principles underlying Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Related Reading
